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Mystical Foundation of Authority' (Derrida 1992) and Judith Butler in 'Critique, Coercion, and Sacred Life in Benjamin's "Critique of Violence"' (Butler 2006 ).
The analysis proceeds as follows. After a brief introduction to the judgment (section two) I introduce the framework of analysis of Walter Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence'. I focus on a key aspect of both Benjamin's critique and the targeted killing judgment -the distinction between lawmaking and law-preserving violence (section three). From the point of view of this distinction I analyse the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over these killings in the first place, the Court's decision on the applicable law as well as the particular interpretation of that law. I argue that the targeted killing judgment collapses the distinction in a different way from that foreseen by Benjamin thus constituting a particular configuration of lawmaking and law-preserving violence (section four).
In conclusion, I consider Judith Butler's reading of Benjamin's 'divine violence', particularly his use of the commandment 'thou shalt not kill', as a non-violent violence that must (I deliberately use the strong modal verb 'must' here for reasons that will be developed infra) be waged against the kind of legal violence of which the targeted killing judgment is exemplary (section five). issued a decision on a petition by a member of the Knesset, Mohammed Barakeh, to stop the killings. In an exceedingly condensed decision, reproduced below in its entirety, the court effectively determined the targeted killing policy 'nonjusticiable':
We read and widely listened to the claims of the Applicant's representative. It seems to us that the announcement given on behalf of the Respondents supplied an exhaustive response to the Applicant's claims. The choice of means of warfare, used by the Respondents to preempt murderous terrorist attacks, is not the kind of issue the Court would see fit to intervene in. This is the case a fortiori when the appeal lacks a firm factual foundation and seeks a sweeping redress. Before someone is considered to fall into the category in question Barak determines that there needs to be '[i]nformation which has been most thoroughly verified … regarding the identity and activity of the civilian who is allegedly taking part in the hostilities' (PCATI, para. 40). Also, a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked, if 'a less harmful means can be employed'
(PCATI, para. 40). This last criterion is derived from the principle of proportionality of internal Israeli law (PCATI, para. 40).
From this brief summary I think it is clear that the judgment provides the government with a flexible category of persons; 'civilians who constitute unlawful combatants' who may lawfully be killed through executive decision without prior judicial oversight. The judgment also provides the government with some leeway with regard to the lawful killing of others than those targeted as 'collateral damage'. Hence, effectively, the judgment enables the Israeli government to proceed with its policy of targeted killings within the bounds of law. 'violence' to be a 'very active interpretation' (Derrida 1992, p. 6 ). An interpretation that does not take account of the fact that Gewalt apart from violence also signifies legitimate power, authority and public force (Derrida 1992, p. 6) . This means that the target for Benjamin's critique is the violence of or in public authority or force. Thus, Judith Butler has described Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence' as a 'critique of legal violence', the kind of violence that the state wields through instating and maintaining the binding status that positive law exercises on its subjects (Butler 2006, p. 201 , emphasis added).
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In Benjamin's critique there are two distinct yet interdependent modalities to legal violence: lawmaking and law-preserving violence (Benjamin 1978, p. 287) . Lawmaking or foundational violence is associated with the moments of the inauguration of law. Derrida notes that these are instances marked by military violence, describing them as 'terrifying moments', exemplified by 'the sufferings, the crimes, the tortures that rarely fail to accompany [the founding of states]' (Derrida 1992, p. 35) .
Apart from this military and physical form of violence, the founding of states is also associated with violence of another kind. Hence, what occurs in the very moment of the inauguration of law and polity can be described as a violent performative act that creates a foundation for the law as well as its enforcement, disguised as a mere constative. This instance can be summarised in the claim that 'This will be law' or, more emphatically, 'This is now the law' (Butler 2006, p. 202) . The fact that this is done, as it were, by fiat, is underscored by Benjamin by declaring it a work of 'fate' (Benjamin 1978, p. 285 ). Derrida has taken this to suggest that the founding of law and polity, epitomised in a 'declaration of independence', cannot rest on anything but itself. Hence, he describes this moment as an instance of 'non-law', but adds, 'it is also the whole history of law' (Derrida 1992, p. 36 ). This event is best described by Derrida not in 'Force of Law' but in his 'The Laws of Reflection. For Mandela, In Admiration':
In the event of such a founding or institution, the properly performative act must produce
(proclaim) what in the form of a constative act it merely claims, declares, assures it is describing.
The simulacrum or fiction then consists in bringing to daylight, in giving birth to, that which one claims to reflect so as to take note of it, as though it were a matter of recording what will have been there, the unity of a nation, the founding of a state, while one is in the act of producing that event. (Derrida 1987) .
It is important to say that according to this account, the military as well as the performative violence that founds law do not amount merely to a historical embarrassment for the law but are always already at stake in all the different instances and practices of application or enforcement.
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This leads us to the second modality of legal violence: law-preserving or conserving violence. This is the repeated and institutionalised effort to make sure that the posited law continually is binding on the population it governs (Butler 2006, p. 202) .
A number of state institutions may be singled out as significant actors in conserving violence. Benjamin's speaks of 'the police' but Derrida points out that the police in this instance do not only refer to the policeman in uniform and with a baton, but, '[b]y definition, the police are present or represented everywhere that there is force of law', that is to say when law is enforced (Derrida 1992, p. 44) . In her reading of Benjamin, Butler mentions that the enforcement of law in courts should also be considered law-preserving violence (Butler 2006, p. 202 (Benjamin 1978, p. 286) .
How so and when so suspended? Derrida writes that the police 'invent law, make themselves lawmaking, legislate each time law is indeterminate enough to give them the chance' (Derrida 1992, p. 43 ) and Benjamin specifically says that this is done 'for security reasons' when the law cannot guarantee the ends that it 'desires at any price to attain' (Benjamin 1978, p. 287 ) which primarily is its own selfpreservation (Benjamin 1978, p. 285) .
In relation to the death penalty Benjamin writes that 'where the highest violence, that over life and death, occurs in the legal system, the origins of law jut manifestly and fearsomely into existence.' (Benjamin 1978, p. 286) . I take this to suggest that the distinction between the two modalities of legal violence is ruined in fatal cases when the origin of law -described by Benjamin as 'violence crowned by fate' -is exposed (Benjamin 1978, p. 286) . Hence, Benjamin writes, in such instances law 'reaffirms itself' and in this very violence 'something rotten in law is revealed' (Benjamin 1978, p. 286 ).
Benjamin's reflections on 'the police' and capital punishment respectively are both relevant to the targeted killing judgment. 
35).
With regard to the killing or injuring of bystanders in a targeted killing attack, this is also less of a problem in this legal framework due to the already mentioned principle of proportionality. According to this principle it is not unlawful to kill or injure bystanders as long as the civilian casualties are not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack, in this case, the killing of the one targeted. From the point of view of this norm, bystanders killed in a targeted killing attack constitute 'collateral damage' given that the proportionality test has been satisfied.
Having considered the decision on the applicable law I will now turn to the Court's interpretation of that law.
mentioned also that Melzer criticises the judgment of the Israeli Supreme Court for completely disregarding the paradigm of law-enforcement (Melzer 2008, p. 34 (Benjamin 1978, p. 281) . In fact, Benjamin addresses the fact that the state according to 'military law' is obliged to acknowledge the lawmaking violence of others when 'external powers force it to concede them the right to conduct warfare', something he, along with the right to strike, describes as an 'objective contradiction in the legal situation' (Benjamin 1978, pp. 283-284) .
In order to avoid the prospect of being obliged to acknowledge the lawmaking violence of others (that is to say, the right for Palestinian militants to 'civilians who constitute unlawful combatants' are legitimate targets for attack 'for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities'; a norm which, as we have seen, may be stretched to include a rather wide group of individuals. Lastly, they do not enjoy the rights granted to combatants. Thus, for example, the laws of prisoners of war do not apply to them (PCATI, para. 25).
The conclusion from the preceding analysis is that Barak, by exercising jurisdiction over Israeli targeted killings, through his decision on the applicable law as well as his particular interpretation of that law, effectively has enabled the Israeli government to proceed with the violence that continues to found the state of Israel while maintaining its monopoly of violence.
THE DESTRUCTION OF LEGAL VIOLENCE
Toward the end of Benjamin's essay there is a distinct shift where Benjamin suddenly drops his careful elaboration of the two modalities of legal violence and instead declares that the 'destruction' of legal violence 'becomes obligatory' (Benjamin 1978, pp. 296-297) be so' instead refers to the judgment in its entirety. In this interpretation the 'Let it be so' serves the function of mobilising the law of the judgment, putting it into operation, effectively constituting its subjects.
As pointed out by Judith Butler there are many reasons to be suspicious about Benjamin's statement about the destruction of legal violence. In particular, since he does not say whether it is obligatory to oppose all legal violence or whether, for example, some forms of obligation that restrain those in power from doing violence should be supported or if subjects should be obligated to the state in any way (Butler 2006, p. 218) . Even though Benjamin never argues that all legal systems should be opposed, one may assume from the level of generality in which he writes that law generally poses a problem for him (Butler 2006, p. 203 and 209) . Neither the categoricalness of his statement nor the partly unrevealed reasons for it should, however, preclude us from making distinctions between the different forms that legal violence takes. As has already been mentioned it is clear, for example, that the death penalty stood out as particularly emblematic of legal violence for Benjamin, and, I would argue, this is true a fortiori for targeted killings.
The obligatory destruction of legal violence poses, according to Benjamin, the question of a 'pure immediate violence' that might be able to 'call a halt' to legal violence (Benjamin 1978, p. 297) . This form of violence Benjamin names 'divine violence'. Benjamin presents to us several ways of apprehending the confrontation between legal and divine violence: legal violence's power over 'mere life for its own sake' is confronted with divine violence understood as 'pure power over all life for the sake of the living' (Benjamin 1978, pp. 295 and 297) ; the bloodiness of legal violence is confronted with divine violence that is exercised 'without bloodshed' (Benjamin 1978, p. 297) ; the making and preserving of law of legal violence is confronted with the 'law-destroying' effects of divine violence (Benjamin 1978, p. 297) ; the setting of boundaries of legal violence is confronted with divine violence which 'boundlessly destroys them' (Benjamin 1978, p. 297) ; the power and power-making of legal violence is confronted with justice, the principle of divine violence (Benjamin 1978, p. 295) .
In her 'Critique, Coercion, and Sacred Life in Benjamin's "Critique of Violence"' Judith Butler offers a compelling reading of Benjamin's divine violence; in particular his use of the commandment 'thou shalt not kill' as a nonviolent violence that must (obligatorily) be waged against the coercive force of positive law.
As has already been mentioned, in contrast with legal violence, referred to by Benjamin in the original German language as Blutgewalt, 12 translated as 'bloody power', Benjamin refers to this non-coercive violence as 'lethal without spilling blood' (Benjamin 1978, p. 297) . This leads Butler to conclude that it is not waged 'against human bodies and human lives' (Butler 2006, p. 201) . In
Butler's account it is instead waged against the legal subject, that is to say, the subject formed by law.
In order to achieve this there is need for a point of view on law that is external to, not on the same order of, the laws that are to be destroyed (Butler 2006, p. 211) . In a peculiar mix of Marxism and Jewish messianism, Benjamin constructs this exterior dimension utilising, on the one hand, the theory of the general strike and, on the other hand, the divine commandment 'thou shalt not kill'. I will start with the commandment and come later to the general strike.
Even though we are accustomed to thinking of the commandment as 'operating in an imperative way, mandating action on our part and ready with a set of punitive actions if we fail to obey', Butler argues that Benjamin makes use of a different Jewish tradition of understanding the commandment; a tradition where the commandment is precisely not the 'vocalization of a furious and vengeful god' but instead strictly separates the imperative from the matter of its enforceability (Butler 2006, p. 204) . In this tradition the commandment delivers an imperative without the capacity to enforce in any way the imperative it communicates (Butler 2006, p. 204) . For, in contrast to law, the commandment 12 Gil Anidjar has recently drawn attention to secondary literature's lack of attention to how blood figures in Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence'. In particular, the much telling notion of Blutgewalt for legal violence has been neglected (Anidjar 2009). has no police force and no army. It is immoveable, 'it is uttered, and it becomes the occasion for a struggle with the commandment itself' (Butler 2006, p. 212 ).
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It is precisely this peculiar form of transmission in the form of a struggle with the commandment that appears to be important for Benjamin rather than the source of the commandment as such.
14 In this account of how the commandment is transmitted, the commandment is open for interpretation and even contravention (Butler 2006, p. 212) . It exists as a 'guideline for the actions of persons or communities who have to wrestle with it in solitude and, in exceptional cases, to take on themselves the responsibility of ignoring it' (Benjamin 1978, p. 298) . Thus, in the final analysis 'what is mandated by the commandment is a struggle with the commandment, whose final form cannot be determined in advance … one wrestles with the commandment in solitude' (Butler 2006, p. 212) . For Butler, the wrestling with the commandment is an anarchistic moment; one that happens without recourse to principle and takes place, as it were, between the commandment and the one who must act in relation to it (Butler 2006, p. 214) . Furthermore, Butler refers to the struggle with the commandment as something that must be 'suffered' irrespective of whether the struggle results in compliance or contravention (Butler 2006, p. 216) . 13 The radical difference between this peculiar transmission of the commandment from the transmission or enforcement of law (as well as the potential for justice of the former but not the latter) finds the following formulation in Benjamin's essay on Kafka: 'the law which is studied and not practiced any longer is the gate to justice' (Benjamin 1968, p. 139 ).
14 Revealingly, in her preface to Benjamin's 'Illuminations', Hannah Arendt writes that Benjamin was greatly attracted not by religion, but by theology and theological interpretation (Arendt 1968, p. 4) .
In this way the commandment not to kill functions as a commandment not to murder the soul (the focus of the divine injunction) of the living, and therefore as a commandment to do violence against the positive law that is responsible for such murder. Such a non-violent violence strikes not at the body or 'organic life' of any individual but precisely at the subject who is formed by law (Butler 2006, p. 211) . Thus, the wrestling with the ethical address 'thou shalt not kill' is a 'lethal' struggle that 'does not stop short of annihilation', yet without spilling any blood in the process (Benjamin 1978, p. 297) .
Assuming that the struggle with the ethical address 'thou shalt not kill' can be understood in the manner outlined by Butler, i.e. as a non-violent violence striking at the subject formed by law; how can this counterforce to the operation of law be understood to function? Put more directly in the context of the targeted killing judgment: how does the struggle with the commandment not to kill oppose a judgment that forms subjects who may lawfully be killed? How can it 'call a halt' to the law mobilised in Barak's 'Let it be so'?
In order to elucidate how this works one will need to consider how the struggle with the commandment is linked to the general strike in Benjamin's critique.
Benjamin understands the general strike to be a form of violence that is fundamentally non-violent in the way that it breaks with the coercive enforcement of law, in refusing to take up anything but a 'wholly transformed work', no longer enforced by the state (Benjamin 1978, pp. 291-292) . Even though one is used to call a strike an action against the state, Butler, following Werner Hamacher, suggests that it is better understood as an omission, that is to say, 'a failure to show, to comply, to endorse, and so to perpetuate the law of the state' (Butler 2006, p. 219) . Hence, Butler likens the individual who struggles with the commandment with the population that take up a general strike 'since both refuse a certain coercion and, in the refusal, exercise a deliberative freedom that alone serves as the basis of human action' (Butler 2006, p. 219) . This freedom provides, in turn, the condition for a sense of responsibility that has as its core and only principle an ongoing struggle with non-violence (Butler 2006, p. 205) .
The bloodless effect of this struggle, this suffering, this strike, this taking responsibility for one's actions, is in Butler's words, a 'separation of legal status from the living being (which would be an expiation or release of that living being from the shackles of positive law)' (Butler 2006, p. 211) .
I find this to be a critical call for an ethical relationship to legal violence that is relevant not only for the 'public officials fulfilling roles pursuant to law' on the West Bank and Gaza, a law on which the Israeli Supreme Court has the 'final and decisive' say, but for anyone who reads and ponders the targeted killing judgment and thus finds herself or himself addressed by Barak's 'Let it be so'. 
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